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Picking up the Pieces: Finding Unity after the 
Communications Decency Act Section 230 
Jurisprudential Clash 
I. INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONAL LIABILITY MEETS THE INTERNET 
In January 1985, Michael Savage submitted a personal service 
classified advertisement to Soldier of Fortune magazine.1 Savage 
was a young Vietnam veteran seeking employment as a bodyguard, 
courier, or mercenary—jobs that could utilize his “special skills.”2 
The overwhelming majority of the 30 to 40 weekly phone calls he 
received were solicitations for his participation in criminal 
activity.3 Succumbing to the lucrative nature of these jobs, Savage 
accepted one in August 1985.4 He and an accomplice were to kill 
Richard Braun, an Atlanta businessman whose own business 
partners had hired Savage.5 On August 26, 1985, as Braun was 
driving down the driveway of his home with his 16-year-old son, 
Savage’s accomplice stepped in front of Braun’s car and 
repeatedly fired his pistol into the car.6 A wounded Braun rolled 
out of his vehicle onto the ground, where Savage’s partner shot 
him twice in the head.7 
Braun’s sons brought suit against Soldier of Fortune magazine, 
alleging its negligence in publishing Savage’s “gun for hire” ad.8 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Savage’s ad should 
have alerted a reasonably prudent publisher to the risk that Savage 
was soliciting illicit jobs.9 As the publisher of Savage’s ad, the 
magazine was liable for $2 million in damages for the wrongful 
death of Richard Braun.10 
Twenty-five years later, murder remains a danger in every U.S. 
city, and the Savage scenario is not unrealistic. The United States 
has embraced the Internet revolution, with its citizens quickly 
adapting their businesses and social lives to the opportunities of 
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 1. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th 
Cir. 1992). 
 2. Id. (“GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs. 
Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and other 
special skills. All jobs considered. [contact information].”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1122. 
 10. Id. at 1114. 




cyberspace. At least one tech-savvy Savage imitator has already 
offered his mercenary services online.11 In fact, the Soldier of 
Fortune scenario could occur almost identically on the Internet 
today, but with one important difference: the murder victim’s 
family would probably recover nothing from the website. As long 
as the website did not help create the ad, it would be completely 
protected from liability by the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”).12  
The CDA is an unyielding federal statute that protects websites 
from liability for anything third parties create or post online.13 It 
contains one of the most powerful legal immunities available—a 
complete protection for any content placed on a website by a third 
party, regardless of the website’s awareness of the content.14 The 
CDA is a formidable legal hurdle to plaintiffs who have suffered 
injury via the Internet. Victims of online housing discrimination,15 
cruel gossip,16 and horrendously defamatory Internet profiles17 are 
all equally unable to sue the websites that host the offending 
content.  
However, there are many who question the far reach of the 
CDA’s protections. These extreme scenarios seem to spout 
injustice; but not all is as it seems. The immunity provided by the 
statute’s modest four sentences has inspired volumes of 
                                                                                                             
 11. In 2008, the disgruntled girlfriend of an Irish millionaire was sentenced 
to six years in prison after arranging for the “accidental death” of her lover and 
his two sons. Although she stumbled upon a willing assassin through a “Hitmen 
for Hire” website, the plot was foiled. Henry McDonald, ‘Caring, Loving and a 
Decent Lady’—Millionaire Pleads for Woman who Sent Hitman to Kill Him, 
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/ 
nov/04/sharon-collins-pj-howard-hitman.  
 12. Or so the overwhelming majority of courts have suggested. See, e.g., 
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting immunity if a website “does not create or 
develop the information . . . .”) (quotations and brackets omitted). 
 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 14. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 15. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (granting classified ad website 
immunity from liability for discriminatory comments of its users who were 
seeking roommates with certain sexual, racial, or religious qualities). 
 16. See Sunny Hostin, Online Campus Gossips Won’t Show Their Faces, 
CNN.COM (Mar. 17, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-03-17/justice/sunny. 
juicy_1_web-site-posts-page-six?_s=PM:CRIME (discussing the inability of 
victims to recover against gossip websites that allow anyone to anonymously 
post rumors about anyone else). 
 17. See, e.g., Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting 
website immunity for a fake profile that was opened on the website under 
someone else’s identity to mock the Oklahoma City bombing). 




interpretive guidance.18 Without any Supreme Court decision to 
guide the federal circuits, the current CDA jurisprudence is an 
amalgamation of interpretive strategies and statutory approaches 
that appear to be hopelessly intertwined. If Savage were to post his 
advertisement online today on Soldieroffortune.com (“SOF.com”), 
the website’s liability might be different depending on which 
interpretative approach the court applied.19 One court might find 
that as long as Savage’s ad was created without the website’s help, 
the website would be immune.20 Another court might find that the 
website would lose its immunity if it knew about the ad’s 
existence,21 while yet another court might find that the website 
would gain immunity only by taking steps to restrict access to the 
ad.22 Finally, another court might find that even if the website 
helped Savage create the ad, it could still gain immunity if it took 
steps to restrict access to it.23  
Chiefly, this Comment posits that there is indeed one superior 
interpretation of the CDA, and that there is not nearly as much 
disagreement as courts have suggested. In order to bring 
consistency to the jurisprudence, courts must not only accept this 
approach, but also actively discard the remnants of failed 
approaches. Part II.A of this Comment lays the foundation of the 
CDA’s congressional development. Part II.B describes the 
jurisprudential development of the statute, with particular attention 
to three of the most prominent federal circuit cases that have 
interpreted it. In Part III, this Comment analyzes the differing 
approaches to the CDA—both the most widely accepted and the 
less prominent approaches. In Part IV, this Comment posits that a 
unified Zeran–publisher approach is best suited for adoption by all 
of the courts. Part IV also challenges those particular courts that 
have pioneered the jurisprudence to refine their methodology, 
renounce misleading reasoning, and finally bring harmony to CDA 
interpretation and application.  
                                                                                                             
 18. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006) (overturning 
the state appellate court’s decision to adopt a different interpretation of the 
CDA); see also discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
 19. Where SOF.com is used in this Comment, the situations and web 
address are merely hypothetical. There is no evidence that such ads are placed 
on Soldier of Fortune’s website, and it appears that the website does not even 
permit classified ads to be displayed online. See SOLDIER OF FORTUNE 
MAGAZINE, http://www.sofmag.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 20. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B. 
 21. See discussion infra Part III.E. 
 22. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.D. 




II. A HISTORY OF CONFLICT: WHERE THE CDA BEGAN AND WHERE 
IT IS GOING 
Only one section of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230, concerns 
website immunity.24 Passed by Congress in February 1996, § 230 
originally served only as an amendment to the broader CDA.25 
Unlike the other provisions of the CDA, § 230 caused little stir 
during its swift passage through Congress.26 Because of § 230’s 
role as an amendment, it is first necessary to consider the 
background and history of its legislative context, the CDA. 
A. The Communications Decency Act 
On February 1, 1995, Senator J. James Exon introduced to the 
Senate what he characterized as the most important legislation on 
which he had ever worked27—the Communications Decency Act.28 
Senator Exon and the bill’s cosponsor, Senator Dan Coats, 
pointedly addressed the U.S. Senate, cautioning that the 
proliferation of online pornography was threatening to infect every 
computer and child in America.29 
1. A Noble Cause 
To combat the perceived threat of rampant online pornography, 
Senator Exon proposed the heart of the CDA, a revision of 47 
U.S.C. § 223. His revision extended the decency and obscenity 
standards that already protected cable and telephone users to a new 
telecommunication device––the Internet.30 Senator Exon was 
primarily concerned with the ease with which children could 
access obscene material on the Internet.31 Many in the Senate 
shared Senator Exon’s concerns, but many also disapproved of the 
sweepingly broad nature of his proposal.32 The Exon–Coats 
                                                                                                             
 24. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 25. Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act 
to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172 (2006). 
 26. See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  
 27. 141 CONG. REC. 15,505 (1995). 
 28. Id. at 3,203. 
 29. Id. Senator Exon introduced his legislation by announcing, “[T]he 
information superhighway should not become a red light district.” Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. There is a disturbing amount of pornography on the Internet, Senator 
Exon reasoned, and it is never more than “a few clicks away from any child with 
a computer.” Id. at 16,009 (statement of Sen. Exon). 
 32. See, e.g., Id. at 16,013 (statement of Sen. Feingold). The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, of which the CDA was only a part, actually 




amendment made it a federal crime to display or describe “patently 
offensive” content to persons under age 18, or merely to 
knowingly transmit with a telecommunications device any 
“communication which is obscene or indecent.”33 
Some senators feared that the CDA’s language would be used 
to punish the messenger.34 They likened its approach to holding the 
mailman liable for the contents of the mail and feared an e-mail 
service could be held criminally liable for an offensive e-mail 
message.35 In the end, the Exon–Coats language was largely 
incorporated into the final CDA.36 However, to secure its passage, 
Senator Exon agreed to add what was, at the time, a deceptively 
uncontroversial House amendment: § 230.37 
2. The Catalyst: Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy 
On August 4, 1995, Representative Christopher Cox proposed 
an amendment to the Exon–Coats CDA bill.38 Entitled “Online 
Family Empowerment,” the amendment was cosponsored by 
Representative Ron Wyden and sought to eliminate some of the 
perceived wording problems of the proposed CDA.39 The 
Congressmen believed Internet services, website operators, and 
families were better situated than the government to control 
obscene or offensive online content.40 However, they worried that 
the existing legal scheme actually discouraged websites from 
participating in the content-monitoring process.41 They further 
worried that the Exon–Coats CDA revision only exacerbated this 
problem.42 Representative Cox pointed to a recent court case, 
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., which suggested that 
                                                                                                             
 
contained a broad deregulatory scheme aimed at reducing government 
involvement in the telecommunications industry. See 142 CONG. REC. 2,042–43 
(1996) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (2002) (prior to amendment). 
 34. 141 CONG. REC. 22,046 (1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859–60 
(1997). 
 37. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 38. 141 CONG. REC. 22,044 (1995). 
 39. Id. at 22,044–46. 
 40. See Id. at 22,045. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id.  




courts would punish websites that tried to screen out offensive 
content far more harshly than those websites that did nothing.43 
In Stratton, a New York appellate court held Prodigy, a website 
operator, liable for defamatory comments posted by an anonymous 
user on the website’s message board.44 In similar cases, other 
courts had refused to find such liability, because the websites knew 
nothing of the content.45 The Stratton court ironically reasoned that 
because Prodigy made efforts to screen inappropriate content, it 
therefore shouldered the burden of liability for any content that did 
get through its screening process.46 Although the Stratton decision 
occurred in the context of defamation liability, it spurred fears that 
an online service provider might be held liable for any illegal 
content displayed using its service.47 “[T]hat is backward,” 
Representative Cox stated, because “[w]e want to encourage 
people like Prodigy . . . to do everything possible . . . to help us 
control [online content].”48 
3. The Shield of § 230 
As a result, the Cox–Wyden amendment purported to do two 
things.49 First, it would protect “computer Good Samaritans,” 
online service providers that take steps to filter indecent or 
offensive material, from “taking on liability such as incurred in the 
Prodigy case.”50 Second, it would “establish as the policy of the 
United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the 
Federal Government of what is on the Internet . . . .”51  
Representatives Cox and Wyden feared that without their 
amendment, the CDA would discourage companies and individuals 
from developing or using technologies to screen indecent 
communications.52 After Stratton, such entities might fear liability 
for failed attempts at screening content.53 Other representatives 
feared that courts might begin holding websites liable for all third-
                                                                                                             
 43. Id.; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 44. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *13–14. 
 45. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 931–32 (E.D. 
Wash. 1992), aff’d, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, 
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
 46. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10. 
 47. 141 CONG. REC. 22,045 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 




party content, regardless of the website’s actions.54 The rest of the 
House apparently agreed, and the Cox–Wyden amendment 
subsequently obtained House approval by a vote of 420 to 4.55 It 
was adopted into the Exon–Coats CDA modification with only 
minor changes.56 With the passage of the CDA in February 1996, it 
became codified in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c): 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material. 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of— 
 (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; 
or 
 (B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means 
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1) 
[subparagraph (A)].57 
It is apparent from its structure that § 230(c) has two distinct 
parts. Section 230(c)(1) specifically provides only that a “provider 
or user of an interactive computer service” shall not be treated as a 
publisher or speaker of third-party content.58 Whether this 
provision is merely descriptive or provides some kind of protection 
is one of the principal debates surrounding § 230.59 Next, § 
                                                                                                             
 54. See Id. at 22,046 (Rep. Goodlatte remarked, “[t]here is no way that any 
of those entities, like Prodigy, can take the responsibility to edit out information 
that is going to be coming in to them from all manner of sources onto their 
bulletin board.”). 
 55. Id. at 22,054. 
 56. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  
 57. Title 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) contains the active provision of the Cox–
Wyden amendment. Sections 230(a) and (b), respectively, contain the 
congressional findings praising the advancements offered by the Internet and the 
congressional policy statements encouraging the development of the Internet 
and fighting criminal activity. Section 230(d), not relevant here, contains an 
obligation to notify customers of parental control protections. Sections 230(e) 
and (f) contain certain exemptions and definitions, respectively. 
 58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 59. See discussion infra Parts III.A–C. 




230(c)(2) specifically provides that a “provider or user of an 
interactive computer service” shall not be held civilly liable 
because of attempts to restrict content or to enable users to restrict 
content.60 From its wording, § 230 therefore appears to immunize 
certain websites from two forms of liability: (1) the inequitable 
Stratton dilemma, whereby a website could be held liable as the 
publisher of all information because of its attempt to filter some of 
the information; and (2) liability to those whose content a website 
filters, although the content is constitutionally protected.61 Roughly 
translated, websites would not face liability for not blocking 
enough content or for blocking too much content. 
The statute also makes a crucial distinction between two classes 
of cyber-entities, “interactive computer services” and “information 
content providers.”62 According to the statute’s definitions, any 
participant in the entire Internet connection process is presumptively 
an interactive computer service.63 However, if interactive computer 
services or people accessing the service create any information, they 
acquire the status of information content provider.64 Under § 
230(c)(1), interactive computer services cannot be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of a content provider’s content.65 Thus, the 
relevant distinction made by these terms is one of content creation. 
Individual websites fall into both of these categories. A website is 
the content provider of any content that it supplies, but it is only an 
                                                                                                             
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). 
 61. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). This immunity effectively eliminates 
two disincentives websites might have to participating in the content-monitoring 
process: the fear of liability for not blocking enough, and the fear of liability for 
blocking too much. 
 62. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2–3) (2006). 
(2) Interactive computer service. The term “interactive computer 
service” means any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to 
a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
(3) Information content provider. The term “information content 
provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service. 
There is a third cyber-entity defined in § 230(f), an “access software provider.” 
However, the statute indicates that this is but a sub-class of the “interactive 
computer service” category, and the only place in § 230 that access software 
providers are referenced is in the definition of interactive computer services. See 
47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (2006). 
 63. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2006). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 




interactive computer service where it merely allows users to add 
information or post comments.66 
B. The Courts Square Off: The Jurisprudential Development of the 
CDA 
The opposition and doubts that the Exon–Coats revision of 
CDA § 223 faced during its congressional passage soon proved to 
be well-founded. In fact, on the same day the CDA was signed into 
law by President Clinton, 20 plaintiffs filed suit, alleging the 
unconstitutionality of § 223.67 It took only one week for a federal 
court to enter a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of 
the overly broad provisions of the statute.68 However, § 230 
remained untouched, and was suddenly detached from the problem 
it was intended to solve.69 
The CDA’s passage soon had another unforeseen consequence. 
As the jurisprudential interpretation of the statute unfolded, the 
previously uncontroversial § 230 became the center of a heated 
debate.70 As it turned out, the few sentences of § 230(c) were not 
so easily applied. Despite the plethora of cases interpreting it, a 
mere handful of these cases contain what are by far the most 
influential interpretations, applications, and limitations of the 
statute.  
1. The Fourth Circuit Strikes First: Zeran v. AOL 
Despite the obscenity- and indecency-oriented nature of the 
CDA, nothing in the wording of § 230 restricts its application to 
such situations.71 Section 230 saw its first interpretation in the case 
                                                                                                             
 66. Courts have had little trouble accepting this proposition. See, e.g., FTC 
v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009); Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 67. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997). 
 68. ACLU v. Reno, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1617 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The 
Supreme Court eventually affirmed the same district court’s finding of the 
unconstitutionality of the content-based indecency provisions of § 223. Reno, 
521 U.S. 844, 885. 
 69. See Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to 
Cyberspace: Towards a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation 
for Internet Service Providers, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 256 
(2000). 
 70. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The 
Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2001). 
 71. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2006) (encompassing obscenity, filthiness, 
violence, harassment, and anything objectionable). 




of Zeran v. AOL, Inc., in which the plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, was 
the victim of a cruel Internet hoax.72 An unknown perpetrator 
claimed to be Zeran and provided his contact information on an 
AOL online bulletin board that allowed users to post publicly 
available content.73 On this forum, the perpetrator began 
advertising t-shirts and other merchandise “glorifying the 
bombing” of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995.74 After 
receiving dozens of threatening phone calls, Zeran learned of the 
source of the prank.75 He immediately contacted AOL, demanding 
that it remove the postings.76 However, even after being notified, 
AOL failed to prevent continued postings.77 Zeran filed suit against 
AOL, alleging AOL’s negligence in failing to adequately respond 
to the malicious postings despite having been made aware of 
them.78 In response, AOL claimed immunity under the newly 
enacted § 230.79 
The Fourth Circuit considered the extent to which § 230 
forbade AOL from being held liable for the anonymously 
contributed content.80 The court highlighted the importance of 
uninhibited Internet communication and determined that, 
accordingly, § 230’s immunity should be “broad.”81 “Specifically, 
§ 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a 
computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”82 Zeran’s claim 
would thus be barred if holding AOL liable placed it in the role of 
publisher.83 To evade this reasoning, Zeran delved into the 
common law definition of “publishers,” claiming that AOL was 
not a publisher as recognized by the CDA.84 
Zeran contended that § 230(c)(1) applied only to a very precise 
notion of “publisher” that should be interpreted in the context of 
traditional defamation law.85 Traditional defamation law allows for 
two different classifications of those who are responsible for 
disseminating and publicizing information.86 The publisher 
                                                                                                             
 72. 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 73. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir.1997). 
 74. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1126. 
 75. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 329. 
 78. Id. at 330. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 331. 
 82. Id. at 330. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 331–32. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 332. 




classification is reserved for those persons or entities that actually 
communicate a given statement, like an author or a newspaper.87 
However, the classification of distributor is given to those persons 
or entities that are merely conduits for the publication efforts of 
someone else, and includes newsstands and booksellers.88 The 
reason for the distinction lies in the respective degree of 
knowledge that distributors have compared to actual publishers.89 
Publishers are likely to be aware of the contents of their 
publications, whereas distributors cannot possibly be expected to 
know the contents of every publication they sell.90 Although 
publishers of information are strictly liable for the contents of their 
communications, distributors are liable only if they are aware of 
defamatory statements.91 
Zeran conceded that the CDA forbids holding AOL strictly 
liable as the publisher of the damaging comments.92 However, he 
claimed that he was not trying to place AOL in the role of 
“publisher,” and therefore it did not qualify for § 230’s 
protections.93 Instead, Zeran argued, because AOL had actual 
knowledge of the comments, he was seeking only to hold AOL 
liable as a “distributor,” something that § 230 did not forbid.94  
Zeran’s argument did not persuade the Fourth Circuit.95 It 
found that the distributor classification is merely one subset of the 
broad common law notion of a publisher.96 More importantly, the 
court noted that Congress passed § 230 specifically to prevent 
websites from avoiding attempts to screen content.97 The Zeran 
court concluded that distributor liability threatened this 
congressional goal because the prospect of liability for knowledge 
might discourage websites from allowing themselves to become 
aware of offensive content.98  
Suddenly, the difficulties of allocating responsibility on an 
anonymous forum like the Internet were a disturbing reality. If the 
websites could not be held liable for the content, then, quite often, 
nobody could. Only § 230(c)(2) explicitly precludes any civil 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 331. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 331−32. 
 95. Id. at 332. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 332–33. 
 98. Id. at 333. 




liability, and it is limited to Good Samaritan screeners; but the 
Fourth Circuit interpreted § 230(c)(1) as conferring a wholly 
separate immunity.99 The court held that § 230(c)(1), “[b]y its plain 
language . . . creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.”100 
Courts have considered the Zeran decision to be the 
“fountainhead” of the “[n]ear-unanimous case law” holding that § 
230 provides immunity to websites from lawsuits that seek to hold 
them liable for others’ contributions.101 However, Zeran has never 
gained complete acceptance among scholars,102 and some courts 
have signaled that they have no intention of adopting Zeran’s 
broad rule.103 
2. The Seventh Circuit Answers: Doe v. GTE and Chicago 
Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist 
If the Fourth Circuit has taken the broadest view of § 230, the 
Seventh Circuit has taken the narrowest. In two separate panel 
opinions, Judge Frank Easterbrook has seriously questioned the 
validity of current interpretations of § 230 immunity.104 In fact, 
writing for the Seventh Circuit, he questioned whether § 230(c)(1) 
actually creates any form of immunity.105  
In Doe v. GTE and Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights v. Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit noted the possibility of an 
alternative reading of § 230(c)(1) that does recognize some 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. at 330. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 
461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688–89 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“Virtually all subsequent courts that have construed Section 230(c)(1) 
have followed Zeran.”); see, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 151–
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protection, but not to the extent of Zeran.106 Instead of an 
immunity for any information originating from third parties, the 
court reasoned that § 230(c)(1) may only prevents any form of 
liability for publishing.107 The most obvious example of such 
liability is the defamation cause of action, which requires that 
someone actually publish the defamatory information.108 However, 
this publisher immunity is also interpreted to prevent liability for 
any actions that are traditionally done by publishers, such as 
screening, displaying, removing, or editing content.109 Withholding 
determination of the issue of § 230 immunity in GTE, the Seventh 
Circuit did not commit to this “publisher approach” until 
Craigslist.110 In Craigslist, the court found that classified ad 
website Craigslist.org could not be held liable for any of the 
discriminatory housing ads of its customers.111 Because any theory 
of liability essentially punished the website for merely publishing 
customer ads, § 230(c)(1) precluded liability.112  
3. A New Battlefront: The Ninth Circuit and Fair Housing 
Council v. Roommates.com 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit did not purport to 
create a new interpretation of § 230, but it did suggest a limit to 
Zeran. It did so with a strict determination of whether a given 
website helped to create the content in question.113 By its plain 
language, § 230(c)(1) does not apply to every website or access 
provider.114 Immunity is available only to a website if it is not an 
information content provider, that is, if it did not create the illegal 
content in question.115  
In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, determined that a website that requires third parties 
to create illegal content is to be considered the creator of that 
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content as well.116 In Roommates.com, the website was accused of 
violating the Fair Housing Act, a federal law that forbids 
discrimination on the basis of certain protected traits in the context 
of housing.117 Roommates.com operated a website that served to 
match those offering roommates or living arrangements with those 
seeking them.118 An integral part of its registration process was a 
series of questions in which registrants were required to indicate 
their own gender as well as their preferences regarding a 
roommate’s gender, sexual orientation, and parental status.119  
In determining the applicability of § 230 immunity, the court 
did not hesitate to recognize the website’s users, who indicate their 
discriminatory preferences, as content providers.120 However, the 
court went a step further by also characterizing Roommates.com as 
a content provider.121 By leaving its users with only discriminatory 
alternatives, it had thus contributed to the development of 
discriminatory content and was outside the scope of § 230 
immunity.122 This interpretation is potentially in conflict with a 
literal reading of the Zeran holding, which precludes all “liability 
for information that originates with third parties.”123 Thus, if a 
website encourages or induces illegal content, it may still be 
considered a de facto content provider.124 
III. AFTER THE DUST SETTLES: SALVAGING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS OF § 230 
There is little doubt that § 230 has caused more controversy 
than Congress ever envisioned. From its uncontroversial roots, § 
230 has quickly spawned a burgeoning record of judicial decisions 
and academic commentary. Although the jurisprudence has 
arguably followed the Zeran decision,125 such a generalization 
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masks a complicated and ongoing debate. Parts of this debate are 
obscure because different courts may reach the same conclusion 
with regard to the ultimate liability of similarly situated 
defendants, yet use wholly different interpretations of the statute. 
Many of the courts even cross-cite and quote conflicting analyses 
in other judicial opinions in support of their own opinions. 
Although the case law has not explicitly acknowledged all of them, 
there are no less than five distinct judicial interpretations of § 230, 
and each one of them alters the degree of protection given to a 
website. 
A. The Fourth Circuit, Zeran v. AOL, and Third-Party Immunity: 
Is There a Victor? 
As the first judicial decision to interpret § 230, Zeran both 
gained quick judicial acceptance and caused immediate 
controversy.126 Its “third-party approach” has been characterized as 
the broadest possible interpretation of the CDA, but such 
complaints have done little to deter its influence.127 At present, 
Zeran’s expansive holding has been adopted by as many as seven 
of the federal circuits.128 Under Zeran’s third-party approach, § 
230 does two things: (1) Section 230(c)(1) contains a broad 
immunity for any content originating with third parties, and (2) § 
230(c)(2) contains a broad immunity for “Good Samaritan” 
content-blockers.129 If the Zeran third-party approach were applied 
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to Mr. Savage’s hypothetical Internet ventures, SOF.com would be 
completely immune from liability for Savage’s ad because the ad 
content originated from a third party. Zeran’s holding provides 
considerable protection to websites and applies even if the website 
is aware of the content. 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Answer––Publisher Immunity 
Zeran’s third-party interpretation has had no shortage of critics. 
Judicial critics of Zeran have been fewer, but there are some courts 
that have fervently rejected its analysis. The most prominent of 
these is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Its rejection of 
Zeran’s third-party approach may seem trivial, but understanding 
the Seventh Circuit’s disagreement is vital to tracing its effects 
upon other decisions and other circuits. 
1. No Truce: The Seventh Circuit’s Holding in Craigslist 
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist, the Seventh 
Circuit specifically rejected the Zeran holding.130 The district court 
placed particular emphasis on Zeran’s extension of immunity from 
all “information originating with a third-party . . . .”131 The court 
perceived this holding as conflicting with the actual wording of § 
230(c)(1), which only “bars those causes of action that would 
require treating an [interactive computer service] as a publisher of 
third-party content.”132 According to the district court, the Zeran 
interpretation is unsupported by the language of § 230 and 
effectively creates a “limitless immunity.”133 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and 
explicitly rejected the third-party approach of Zeran.134 Instead, the 
Seventh Circuit adopted a “publisher approach,” refusing to find a 
website liable under any cause of action that punishes the website 
for being a publisher.135 Under this approach, websites are immune 
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for exercising traditional publisher functions, such as displaying, 
removing, or censoring content.136 Faced with the publisher 
approach, SOF.com would still be immune from liability for Mr. 
Savage’s ad because the website’s only role in the entire scheme 
was as a publisher who displayed the ad. 
2. Shifting Alliances: The Publisher Approach Gains Support 
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in requiring the element of 
publication. The Ninth Circuit has echoed the concerns of the 
Seventh Circuit, warning that providing § 230 immunity anytime a 
website used third-party content would “eviscerate” the statute.137 
The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that the threshold question 
for § 230 immunity is whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold a 
website accountable as the “publisher or speaker of third-party 
content.”138 In fact, this view of § 230 is emerging as the preferred 
interpretation throughout the federal circuits.139 One might wonder 
how this is even possible, considering the “near-unanimous” 
consensus that has supposedly evolved in support of Zeran’s 
holding.140 This conflict presents one of the more confusing 
considerations for courts applying § 230. The third-party approach 
and the publisher approach have been viewed as fundamentally 
different, yet, in many instances, they both find support within the 
same judicial decision.  
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3. Hints of Agreement: Comparing Zeran’s Third-Party 
Immunity to Craigslist’s Publisher Immunity 
The Craigslist district court opinion provides a detailed 
breakdown of the supposed differences between Zeran’s third-
party approach and the Seventh Circuit’s publisher approach.141 
Principally, the Craigslist court posited that Zeran’s holding is far 
too broad, that its definition of publisher activities is also too 
broad, and that courts are applying it almost blindly in practice.142 
However, if these differences are exaggerated, then there is the 
possibility of sweeping agreement among the federal circuits. 
a. The Shield of § 230(c)(1): Immunity or Imagination? 
The Seventh Circuit opinions in GTE and Craigslist contribute 
greatly to the apparent discrepancy between the two approaches. In 
both cases, the court questioned whether § 230(c)(1) “creates any 
form of immunity.”143 After all, it is § 230(c)(2) that is actually 
phrased as an immunity for Good Samaritan screeners.144 The 
Craigslist district court noted that courts following Zeran fail to 
address this divergence in the statutory language.145 However, the 
Craigslist court failed to explain how its interpretation of § 
230(c)(1) actually offers something that is not, for all intents and 
purposes, also an immunity.146 In reality, the effect of the Craigslist 
holding is identical to the holding of Zeran and its progeny: no 
website can face liability for publishing third-party content.  
b. Illusions of Disagreement: The Substantive Effect of 
Craigslist’s Distinction 
Taken literally, Zeran’s third-party approach immunizes a 
website from liability for any third-party content.147 The publisher 
approach supplies an immunity-like protection for publishing any 
third-party content. It also purports to limit protection to a 
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website’s publication decisions such as displaying, reviewing, 
editing, withdrawing, and deciding whether to publish content.148 
However, one would be hard-pressed to hypothesize even one 
scenario where this distinction truly matters. It would require a 
website to somehow display a third party’s content without 
publishing it, a seemingly impossible situation. Because publishing 
merely means “to disseminate to the public,” as a medium of 
information display, anything that a website does is publishing.149 
The “narrower” reading adopted by the Seventh Circuit in 
Craigslist is not narrower at all when everything that a website 
does is inherently some form of publishing.  
Further supporting the superficiality of this distinction is the 
Zeran opinion itself. Other parts of that opinion confirm that the 
Fourth Circuit meant to make no distinction between its holding 
and holdings like that in Craigslist. The Zeran court devoted most 
of its analysis to the publisher determination, and even specifically 
stated, “[Section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims 
that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s 
role.”150 However, instead of acknowledging that the Zeran 
opinion also establishes a requirement of publishing activity, the 
Craigslist court dismissed this language as an “internal 
inconsistency” that lessens the persuasiveness of the entire Zeran 
opinion.151 
c. “Publishing” in Zeran vs. “Publishing” in Craigslist 
Even where the Zeran court discussed a “publisher” 
requirement, the district court in Craigslist maintained that the two 
courts’ definitions of publisher activities were in hopeless 
conflict.152 The Craigslist court worried that Zeran’s definition of 
publisher functions, which includes altering third party content, 
would permit a website to actually create content under the guise 
of altering it.153 In such a case, the website could be immune from 
liability under the third-party approach for content it actually 
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created, because it changed content that originated from a third 
party.154 Although this is technically true under a literal reading of 
Zeran’s holding, it is plainly an absurd application of Zeran’s 
wording.  
As the Craigslist court noted, if a website altered content, then 
it would “no longer be posting information provided by ‘another 
content provider’ . . . .”155 However, there is nothing in the Zeran 
opinion’s wording that forbids the third-party approach from 
making the same distinction. In fact, Zeran recognizes that if AOL 
had created the illegal content, then the content would no longer 
originate from a third party, and third-party immunity would not 
apply.156  
d. Reaching a Truce: Harmonizing Zeran’s Third-Party 
Approach and Craigslist’s Publisher Approach 
To interpret the two approaches harmoniously, a court would 
need to appropriately apply the Zeran approach in an alteration 
situation. It is reasonable to assume that if a website altered content 
to the extent of actually creating content, then a court would 
correctly identify the site as an information content provider, thus 
not entitled to immunity. However, the Craigslist district court 
determined that “[t]his is not an idle concern.”157 It worried that 
courts were using Zeran to bestow immunity on websites because 
they actually altered the content, which would make them 
publishers under a literal reading of Zeran.158 The Craigslist 
district court feared that courts would end their inquiry there 
instead of withholding immunity if it was the website’s alteration 
that actually made the comment offensive or defamatory.159 
However, the Craigslist court’s fears are quite unfounded. The 
court cited three cases that were apparently the best examples of 
this abusive application of Zeran’s third-party approach.160 A close 
inspection of these cases reveals that the scenario about which 
Craigslist was so worried has never actually occurred.161 
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On the contrary, courts that subscribe to the Zeran approach 
have been keenly aware of these considerations. Subsequent 
jurisprudence relying on Zeran has noted that the immunity status 
of publishers who edit content only extends to editing of material 
that “retain[s] its basic form and message.”162 Recognition of this 
principle has stemmed from § 230’s definition of “information 
content provider,” which encompasses any entity that is 
responsible, even in part, for the “development” of the content in 
question.163 Courts have taken hold of this language, remaining 
vigilant in their concern that a website not be permitted to 
contribute to the illegality of content.164 It was precisely this 
reasoning that led the en banc Ninth Circuit to hold that 
Roommates.com was an unprotected content provider when it 
forced its users to choose from a list of discriminatory 
alternatives.165 The court in Roommates.com even went so far as to 
say that those who encourage illegal content may forfeit their CDA 
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immunity.166 In fact, the vast majority of the “Zeran-approach” 
circuits have explicitly left room for liability based on the 
inducement of illegal content.167 This should resolve any concerns 
of the Craigslist court that Zeran threatens to provide a “limitless 
immunity.”168  
With these considerations in mind, the effect on SOF.com’s 
hitman advertisement is not to be underestimated. Under the Zeran 
third-party approach or the publisher approach, SOF.com would 
not be liable for the contents of Mr. Savage’s ad. However, if 
SOF.com encouraged or induced the ad, then the website would 
forfeit its § 230 immunity. 
e. Craigslist’s Attack on Zeran: Friendly Fire 
This detailed breakdown of the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of 
Zeran suggests an interesting possibility. The approach to which 
the Seventh Circuit subscribes has no substantive difference from 
the Zeran approach that it so explicitly rejects. Acknowledgement 
of this premise reconciles the surprising number of cases that 
appear to have adopted both the Zeran third-party approach and the 
publisher approach recognized by the Seventh Circuit.169 If this is 
true, then there is actually an overwhelming majority of courts, 
including the Seventh Circuit, currently in agreement on how to 
interpret § 230: a unified Zeran–publisher immunity. Indeed, the 
subtle distinction between these two “differing” approaches is lost 
even on the Fourth Circuit, which recently cited Craigslist to 
support its own Zeran § 230 interpretation.170 Although this debate 
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may seem pointless, the semantic disagreement between Zeran and 
Craigslist has actually been the root of the confusion that has 
denied the CDA jurisprudence the uniformity it so badly needs. 
C. Cause for Disagreement: Definitional Clauses and a 
Definitional Immunity 
If jurisprudential discussions of the CDA are to be understood 
fully, one must delve deeper into the past. Five years before 
Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit first considered the reach of CDA 
immunity in Doe v. GTE.171 At the time, the court was not required 
to adopt an approach, but it nonetheless spoke on the matter in 
dicta, explicitly disagreeing with the third-party approach of 
Zeran.172 It was here that the Seventh Circuit first offered the 
publisher approach as only a possibility, but it was also here that 
the court offered another possibility, a far more extreme departure 
from the Zeran holding.173 Spawning a new definitional approach, 
the Seventh Circuit posited that § 230(c)(1) could be read “as a 
definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability.”174 In 
other words, § 230(c)(1) provides no protection, but only provides 
the background for § 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity. If an 
entity did not contribute the content, then it is not a publisher under 
§ 230(c)(1) and is therefore eligible for immunity given to Good 
Samaritan screeners under § 230(c)(2).175 Conversely, if an entity 
did contribute the content, then it is the publisher or speaker of that 
content and is ineligible for Good Samaritan screener immunity 
under § 230(c)(2).176 
This interpretation of § 230 would be revolutionary. It would 
effectively erase the entire body of law developed after Zeran. 
Under a definitional interpretation, § 230 offers no immunity 
unless an entity qualifies as an interactive service provider that did 
not contribute the content, and has taken Good Samaritan actions 
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to restrict access to it.177 If Mr. Savage’s hitman ad on SOF.com 
were scrutinized under the definitional approach, then SOF.com 
would have no immunity unless the website made Good Samaritan 
attempts to filter or remove it or similar ads. Even if SOF.com took 
such Good Samaritan steps, § 230(c)(2) would not provide a 
blanket immunity, but only a protection from liability “on account 
of” those steps.178 The definitional approach effectively limits the 
application of § 230 exclusively to scenarios like Stratton, where 
the website was punished because it attempted to screen the 
offensive content of others.179 
Despite the extreme departure from any recognized 
interpretation, the Seventh Circuit offered several justifications for 
a definitional approach. First, unlike the distinct immunity granted 
by § 230(c)(2), § 230(c)(1) is phrased as a definition.180 Second, 
the broad third-party immunity of Zeran arguably has the exact 
opposite effect of what Congress intended—it encourages websites 
and interactive services to do nothing, because taking Good 
Samaritan screener steps provides no additional immunity.181 
Third, the title of § 230(c) is “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material.”182 Only by limiting 
the protection of § 230(c)(1) to Good Samaritan screeners is it 
possible to interpret § 230 consistently with its title.183 
1. Misplaced Loyalties: The Seventh Circuit and the 
Definitional Approach 
The definitional approach has not garnered the support of even 
one court, including the Seventh Circuit that first offered it as a 
possibility. Yet, the reasoning that supports it pervades the cases of 
both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.184 The Seventh Circuit 
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advanced it only as a possibility in the dicta of Doe v. GTE before 
the court settled on the publisher interpretation in Craigslist.185 
Because of GTE, though, some courts were under the impression 
that the Seventh Circuit had chosen the definitional approach.186 
Even the Craigslist decision has not clarified the matter.187 The 
Seventh Circuit’s apparent adherence to two conflicting 
interpretations can be attributed to the disproportionate attention 
the Seventh Circuit allotted to discussing the definitional 
interpretation in both the GTE and Craigslist opinions.188 Although 
GTE devoted one sentence to suggest the publisher reading, which 
the court actually adopted in Craigslist, the GTE opinion devoted 
three paragraphs to discussing the definitional approach.189 
Five years later, in Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit compounded 
the disproportionate analysis it gave to the definitional approach in 
GTE by reciting the entire discussion again.190 Unlike the opinion 
in GTE, the Craigslist opinion allots a few more sentences to the 
publisher approach.191 Even then, the court fails to adopt explicitly 
the publisher approach, and likewise fails to reject explicitly the 
definitional approach.192 However, Craigslist’s holding makes it 
clear that the court applied the publisher approach because it was 
“only in a capacity as publisher” that Craigslist could be liable.193 
Such a holding grants immunity for publisher actions and is 
implicitly incompatible with a definitional view of § 230(c)(1) that 
does not recognize any protection absent Good Samaritan blocking 
efforts. However, the court’s disproportionate discussion of a view 
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that it rejected and its lack of an explicit choice combine to create a 
misleading and confusing opinion in Craigslist. Because of this 
confusion, even the rejected definitional interpretation of § 
230(c)(1) has remained relevant.194 
2. Mixed Signals: The Ninth Circuit and Definitional 
Reasoning 
The Seventh Circuit’s Craigslist opinion has misled more than 
one court. The Ninth Circuit’s Roommates.com opinion is a salient 
example.195 There, the Ninth Circuit adopted the view that § 
230(c)(1) provides a publisher immunity.196 However, almost in 
passing, the Roommates.com opinion recites much of the argument 
advanced by the Seventh Circuit to support the definitional 
approach.197 
The Roommates.com opinion begins by recognizing that 
Congress intended to “immunize the removal of user-generated 
content, not the creation of content.”198 Taken literally, this 
proposition challenges the utility of awarding § 230 immunity in 
situations other than those where the online entity is liable for 
removing someone else’s content, which only Good Samaritan 
screeners do.199 The Roommates.com court next contended that it 
was “perhaps the only purpose” of § 230 to overrule the specific 
problem that occurred in Stratton.200 However, by recognizing only 
§ 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity, it is the definitional 
approach that is limited precisely to “overrul[ing]” the specific 
problem that occurred in Stratton.201 Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
joined the Seventh Circuit in finding that “[i]ndeed, the section is 
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titled ‘Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of 
offensive material’ and . . . the substance of section 230(c) can and 
should be interpreted consistent with its caption.”202 
These arguments support only one interpretation of § 230: the 
definitional approach. A court cannot interpret the Good Samaritan 
title of § 230(c) consistently with its substance and still find that it 
applies outside the context of Good Samaritan blocking. Nor can a 
court genuinely argue that the “only purpose” of § 230 is to 
overrule Stratton, and then apply § 230 to any context where the 
website does not attempt to restrict content as did the website in 
Stratton. In spite of all this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit formally 
adheres to the Zeran-publisher approach.203 As time has shown, 
without correction, this confusion threatens to further complicate 
the already cloudy CDA jurisprudence. 
D. The Conflict Escalates: The Ninth Circuit, Barnes v. Yahoo, 
and a Reverse Definitional Approach 
It was not long before the Ninth Circuit was forced to explain 
its Roommates.com holding. In 2009, Barnes v. Yahoo! forced the 
Ninth Circuit to confront the conflict between its publisher 
immunity standard and its definitional immunity reasoning.204 
Compared to other cases, it should have been an easy decision. The 
plaintiff, Cecilia Barnes, much like the plaintiff in Zeran, was the 
victim of a fake Internet profile.205 This time the profile 
proclaimed the plaintiff’s promiscuity and sexual deviancy.206 The 
court easily identified her claim as an attempt to hold the Yahoo 
website liable for its role as a publisher, and held that publisher 
immunity barred the claim.207 However, Barnes’s complaint 
included one argument the Ninth Circuit had to address separately. 
1. The Reconciliation 
Even though the court held that publisher immunity applied, 
Barnes’s complaint forced the court into a corner. She cited the 
court’s own en banc opinion in Roommates.com to remind the 
court that the purpose of § 230 was to encourage websites to take 
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action, “not to provide an excuse for doing nothing.”208 The Barnes 
court went on to reaffirm that reasoning209 and reaffirm the 
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, all the while supporting an 
argument for a strictly definitional reading of § 230(c)(1).210 
Finally, the court acknowledged that its citation to differing 
interpretations was an “apparent contradiction,” and so attempted 
to resolve it.211 
The Ninth Circuit panel in Barnes began its explanation by 
reciting the publisher interpretation of § 230(c).212 However, the 
court continued with an attempted explanation of the “apparent 
contradiction” between its adoption of the publisher approach and 
its praise for the reasoning of the definitional approach.213 It next 
established that it is “crucia[l]” to understand that § 230(c)(2) 
protects: 
not merely those whom subsection (c)(1) already protects, 
but any provider of an interactive computer service. Thus, 
even those who cannot take advantage of subsection (c)(1), 
perhaps because they developed, even in part, the content at 
issue, can take advantage of subsection (c)(2) if they act to 
restrict access to the content because they consider it 
obscene or otherwise objectionable.214 
2. Stalling for Time: The Reverse Definitional Interpretation of 
Barnes 
The Barnes reasoning is extremely confusing, and the court’s 
opinion contains no further explanation or application. However, it 
appears to provide a third level of immunity––one that a content 
provider or creator is eligible for “if they act to restrict access to 
[the content] . . . .”215 The Ninth Circuit has effectively retained the 
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effects of the prevalent § 230 interpretation unchanged. It has also 
added, however, a completely new immunity for which only good 
faith screeners who are also content providers are eligible.216 If Mr. 
Savage’s hitman ad is reconsidered under this approach, the 
consequences are startling. According to the Barnes court, 
SOF.com could actually help Mr. Savage create the hitman ad, 
display it on the website, and then gain immunity by subsequently 
taking steps to restrict access to it. 
The Barnes opinion, while attempting to reach a publisher 
immunity conclusion, defends definitional immunity reasoning 
while creating a brand new interpretation: a “reverse definitional 
immunity.” The Barnes interpretation could be called “reverse,” 
because a definitional reading of § 230(c)(1) establishes which 
parties are eligible for the Good Samaritan screener immunity of § 
230(c)(2); Barnes, however, creates an immunity for someone who 
is completely ineligible for the definitional qualification of § 
230(c)(1): a website that, although a content provider, has made 
efforts to screen that provide immunity under § 230(c)(2).217 In this 
maze of statutory inbreeding, it is easy to miss that this explanation 
does not change anything about the “apparent contradiction:” a § 
230(c)(1) publisher approach protects websites that do nothing. 
E. A Resilient Survivor: Strict Publisher Immunity 
The four CDA approaches discussed above comprise the bulk, 
if not all, of “active” § 230 interpretations. Nonetheless, there is at 
least one other approach that remains relevant despite its lack of 
judicial embrace—the approach that the Fourth Circuit rejected in 
Zeran.218 The “strict publisher” approach accepts the immunity of 
the publisher approach, but applied only to a restricted category of 
publishers.219  
The strict publisher approach contends that the publisher 
immunity of § 230(c)(1) precludes only the strict liability that 
direct publishers traditionally faced. This interpretation leaves 
room for the notice- or knowledge-based liability of distributors.220 
Applying the same reasoning to online entities, § 230(c)(1) would 
immunize a website only from strict liability as a publisher of 
third-party content. However, if they were aware of its subject 
matter and dissemination, these same websites could be held liable 
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as distributors of third-party content. In the SOF.com hitman ad 
scenario, SOF.com would be immune from liability as a publisher. 
However, as a distributor, SOF.com would be immune from 
liability for Mr. Savage’s ad only until the website was notified of 
the ad’s existence. 
F. The Battle Rages On: Other Interpretations 
One should not take this Comment’s enumeration of § 230 
approaches to imply a limit. Although the five approaches described 
above have garnered the most attention and commentary, § 230 has 
an uncanny ability to inspire judicial and interpretive creativity. One 
judge has suggested that CDA immunity should apply only when 
the website takes no active role in selecting which content gets 
published, something the Zeran–publisher approach permits under 
the protected traditional acts of a publisher.221 Others have 
suggested that courts adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, 
weighing context-specific factors in each case.222 There is also no 
shortage of commentators, including judges who appear to have 
followed Zeran only begrudgingly, and who wait for Congress or 
courts to begin remodeling the CDA.223 Until Congress or the 
Supreme Court finally settles this dispute, every one of these 
approaches remains viable. 
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IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: REGROUPING AND REFINING 
It is understandably intimidating for a court to interpret the 
CDA today. Section 230’s jurisprudence is a rare example of such 
extreme complexity, disarray, and importance in case law, yet it 
lacks a single guiding Supreme Court decision. A court unfamiliar 
with the history of the statute and unaware of its differing 
interpretations faces a daunting challenge. After gaining an 
understanding of the law, however, courts could create a uniform 
body of § 230 jurisprudence that is balanced, equitable, and finally 
in harmony.  
A. The Victor Leaves the Battlefield 
The prospect of unity in the jurisprudence of the CDA is an 
attractive concept. The parallel application of the Zeran third-party 
approach and publisher approach is perhaps the only method to 
achieve this goal. A unified Zeran–publisher approach 
acknowledges the unity of the two approaches, and single-
handedly embraces the bulk of the CDA’s jurisprudential analyses. 
1. The Perceived Inequities of a Zeran–Publisher Approach 
There has been no shortage of critics of the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Zeran.224 Some wonder why websites should 
experience such an unfair advantage over traditional print 
media.225 Moreover, some feel a broad immunity is a 
disproportionate legislative response to the problem Congress 
sought to correct in Stratton.226 Others disapprove of the prospect 
of immunizing websites that acquiesce to or benefit from their 
users’ illegal content.227 
a. Websites vs. Newspapers: Unfair Treatment? 
Some critics take issue with the disparate treatment now 
experienced by the brick-and-mortar counterparts of websites, such 
as newspapers and newsstands, which face immensely greater 
exposure for content that websites can allow freely.228 A physical 
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newspaper’s classified ad or opinion section remains within the 
realm of strict liability, but an online newspaper’s classified ad or 
comments section is immune.229 Returning briefly to the story of 
Mr. Savage and Soldier of Fortune magazine,230 his victim’s family 
received $4 million when the magazine displayed Savage’s hitman 
ad.231 Yet, it is troubling to acknowledge that if Soldier of Fortune 
magazine is eclipsed by SOF.com, the same classified ad displayed 
on the website would result in no similar form of liability. 
Although this concession is seemingly unfair, it is necessary in 
light of the interests at stake. Looking to the legislative debate 
surrounding the CDA, this result is the unavoidable and, indeed, 
intended result of the CDA.232 Unlike their physical equivalents, 
many online services operate in such a way that every single 
comment by a third-party user is automatically posted, with the 
number of comments and posts on a given website reaching into 
the millions.233 A comprehensive monitoring system on heavily-
trafficked websites might be financially burdensome, unfeasible, or 
impossible. As Congress observed, it is the open-ended nature of 
such websites that makes them both so attractive and so difficult to 
monitor, and therefore so in need of protection.234 
b. Publisher Liability vs. Distributor Liability: Knowledge is 
Not Power 
Even if the proposition of limited liability for online content is 
accepted, perhaps Congress intended that actual knowledge of a 
defamatory or illegal post could still subject a website to liability.235 
This was the brunt of the plaintiff’s argument in Zeran—a strict 
publisher approach contending that § 230 should not foreclose the 
common law notion of distributor liability.236 The strict publisher 
approach would impose distributor liability on a website if it was 
notified of illegal content.237 In the Soldier of Fortune hypothetical, 
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this would permit SOF.com to face liability for a hitman ad if the 
website was notified or knew of its illegal or dangerous nature. 
Despite these troubling worst-case scenarios, the unified Zeran–
publisher approach explicitly accepts this risk.238 This has troubling 
implications, such as leaving no incentive for websites like AOL or 
SOF.com to take down extremely damaging or even dangerous 
posts they know to exist.239 However, such concerns are not 
dispositive. As the Zeran court pointed out, § 230(c)(1) precludes 
any form of publisher liability.240 There is a distinction between 
publishers and distributors, but traditional defamation law suggests 
that a distributor is only one form of the more general classification 
of publisher.241 The wording of § 230(c)(1) is much too general to 
read such a context-specific distinction into the statute.242 
Moreover, in passing § 230, Congress sought to prevent 
websites from being punished for attempts to screen content.243 
Distributor liability threatens this congressional goal, because the 
prospect of liability for knowledge might discourage websites from 
allowing themselves to ever become aware of offensive content.244 
Websites might remove any system of formal notification so that 
they cannot have knowledge imputed to them.245 A website might 
also face a substantial burden if it must investigate every complaint 
it receives, or else face liability.246 As the Zeran court feared, 
websites might choose instead to just remove all content that is 
complained about, without regard to its offensiveness or the 
resulting chilling effect on free speech.247 
Finally, courts should give due deference to the congressional 
response to the prevailing Zeran–publisher approach. In 2002, a 
conference committee report of the House of Representatives 
signaled its complete approval of the jurisprudential application of 
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this approach, explicitly endorsing Zeran and two other cases that 
have followed the Zeran–publisher interpretation.248 Such informal 
approval should not dissuade a court from following a statute’s 
wording, but it does prove that Congress is satisfied with § 230’s 
effect and will not support any other interpretation of the statute. 
2. A Unified Alliance: The Zeran–Publisher Approach 
The Zeran–publisher approach is not perfect. Like any 
approach, it has negative consequences. It is no easy task to 
balance the competing interests of uninhibited information 
exchange with guaranteed liability for abuses of that exchange. 
However, the Zeran–publisher approach represents the best policy 
decision. Uninhibited defamation and illegal content without any 
hope of a website’s intervention is more of a danger in theory than 
in practice. In reality, public relations considerations alone are 
enough to induce a website to remove illegal content. Immunity in 
spite of knowledge could potentially protect websites who 
downright refuse to remove illegal content. More often, however, 
such expansive immunity will operate to protect innocent websites 
from having knowledge imputed to them by virtue of a complaint 
of which they may not actually be aware. 
The Zeran–publisher approach offers the best method to courts 
faced with the CDA today. Its wording is grounded in the statutory 
language of § 230 and is most capable of honoring the intent of the 
statute.249 It balances the desire to protect websites from an 
impossible burden with the desire to hold creators of illegal content 
liable. Its widespread acceptance offers uniformity amid a 
disheveled jurisprudence.  
3. The Zeran–Publisher Approach—Adaptability and Capability 
Courts have proven exceptionally capable at adapting and 
shaping the limits of the Zeran–publisher approach. The Seventh 
Circuit was correct to be wary of a strict application of Zeran, but 
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applicable to those entities covered by [new legislation].” 
 249. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2006). 




other courts have limited it appropriately to retain the spirit of § 
230 and align Zeran’s third-party immunity with the Seventh 
Circuit’s publisher immunity.250 In particular, the Ninth Circuit has 
done an exemplary job of preventing any unfair application of the 
prevailing approach.251 Faced with Roommates.com’s requirement 
that its customers choose discriminatory roommate preferences, the 
court carefully considered to what extent Roommates.com 
“developed” the content.252 Leaving the spirit of § 230 intact, the 
court recognized that although it was the customers who ultimately 
entered their discriminatory choice, it was the website that had 
effectively created the content by forcing its customers to do so.253 
As mentioned earlier, courts have already suggested that any 
culpable behavior by a website will not go unnoticed.254 As many 
as seven federal circuits have signaled that encouraging or 
inducing a third party to create questionable content might be 
sufficient to forfeit immunity.255 The courts’ proven readiness to 
adapt the Zeran–publisher approach to common sense notions of 
equity makes it an especially attractive alternative.256 
B. The Remnants of Defeat: The Remains of Alternative Approaches 
If courts recognize the unity of the Zeran–publisher approach, 
any other approach will exist only as a minority view. However, 
because of its unfavorable consequences, plaintiffs repeatedly 
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 251. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165–69 (9th Cir. 2008) (not permitting 
website to encourage illegal content); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 
1106–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (not permitting website to apply immunity to liability 
for subsequent promises regarding content). 
 252. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–69. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. at 1175 (“If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your 
website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”); Chi. 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that any inducement of illegal 
content would not be protected); see also supra note 167. 
 255. See supra note 167. 
 256. One Ninth Circuit opinion deserves particular recognition for its astute 
reasoning. Ironically, this ruling was a completely separate part of the Barnes v. 
Yahoo opinion. 570 F.3d 1096, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009). Creating the reverse 
definitional immunity in response to the plaintiff’s negligence complaint, the 
Ninth Circuit also faced a separate complaint for promissory estoppel to which 
neither publisher immunity nor reverse definitional immunity applied. See id. 
The court found that § 230 did not forbid holding Yahoo liable for its 
representative’s promise that it would immediately remove the ad, if the plaintiff 
relied on that promise to her detriment. Id. at 1106–09. 




attempt to persuade courts to apply alternative interpretations of § 
230. Without a Supreme Court decision to bind the circuits, there 
is nothing to prevent a federal circuit from changing its 
interpretation. Also, recognizing the supporting reasoning behind 
these alternative interpretations can help courts avoid the result of 
inadvertently supporting a conflicting approach in dicta. 
1. The Definitional Approach as a Viable Alternative 
Despite its lack of support, the definitional approach arguably 
finds much greater support in the statute’s intent, title, and 
structure.257 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that this approach 
would harmonize the statute with its purpose and its title, 
“Protection for Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening . . . .”258 
The court acknowledged that Zeran has been followed by four 
federal circuits, yet it could not reconcile it with the language of § 
230(c)(1).259 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in GTE questions the 
utility of immunizing interactive computer services under § 
230(c)(1) for doing nothing, when the entire purpose underlying its 
enactment was to prevent interactive services from doing nothing.260  
a. The Definitional Approach and the Structure of § 230 
The trouble with rejecting the definitional approach is that it 
makes sense. Indeed, at the time of its enactment, the definitional 
reading of § 230 was possibly exactly what Congress had in mind. 
This partially explains why it has been so easy for a court like the 
Ninth Circuit to unwittingly support the definitional approach in its 
                                                                                                             
 257. It should be noted that some courts also characterize the publisher 
interpretation of the Seventh Circuit as definitional. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 255 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Seventh 
Circuit, for example, prefers to read ‘§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather 
than as an immunity from liability.’”). Craigslist appears to affirm that the 
Seventh Circuit shares this view. 519 F.3d at 670 (“Why not read § 230(c)(1) as 
a definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability . . . ?”). However, 
as explained earlier, regardless of its name, the Seventh Circuit publisher 
protection operates as an immunity. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.a. The 
only truly definitional reading of § 230 is the one offered by GTE and rejected 
by Craigslist. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 258. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 259. Id. at 659–60 (citing the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). 
 260. Id. at 660 (“Yet § 230(c) . . . bears the title ‘Protection for “Good 
Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material,’ hardly an apt 
description if its principal effect is to induce [Internet service providers] to do 
nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their 
services.”). 




reasoning.261 Any interpretation of § 230 that pretends to be 
completely in harmony with the statute’s structure, wording, 
purpose, and history will have trouble defending that assertion. 
This is why it is important to acknowledge and concede the 
shortcomings of the unified Zeran–publisher approach. 
The very structure of the statute supports the definitional 
approach. As the district court in Craigslist noted, it defies 
principles of statutory interpretation to interpret § 230(c)(2) to 
provide an immunity with its definitive wording—“No provider . . . 
shall be liable . . . .”—and to simultaneously interpret § 230(c)(1) to 
provide an even greater immunity without any equivalent 
wording.262 A broad publisher immunity reading of § 230(c)(1) also 
renders § 230(c)(2) completely superfluous. By interpreting § 
230(c)(1) to cover all publishing acts, a Good Samaritan screener 
never even needs to resort to the Good Samaritan immunity in § 
230(c)(2).263  
Another recurring argument for the definitional approach is the 
title of § 230(c): “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”264 This title encompasses both § 
230(c)(1) and § 230(c)(2), yet the Zeran–publisher approach posits 
that a Good Samaritan requirement is only applicable to § 
230(c)(2).265 However, this inconsistency in the title is not enough 
                                                                                                             
 261. See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2008); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1096, 1100-05 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 262. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under The Law v. Craigslist, 
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the content-provider where the website wrongfully removed its content. See, 
e.g., GTE, 347 F.3d at 660 (characterizing § 230 as “designed to eliminate 
[Internet service providers’] liability to the creators of offensive material”); 
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 520–21 (Cal. 2006). It is possible that this 
could happen, but it is highly unlikely that third-party content-providers have 
First Amendment or any other rights on a private party’s website in the first 
place. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgement by government, 
federal or state.”). Not surprisingly, this function of § 230(c)(2) remains much 
more convincing in theory than in practice. 
 264. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 265. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have made this same point, albeit 
in support of the Zeran–publisher approach. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1164 (“[T]he substance of section 230(c) can and should be interpreted 
consistent with its caption.”); see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights 




to make the definitional approach a superior alternative to the 
Zeran–publisher approach. It is elementary that a statute’s 
provisions trump its title if the two conflict.266 It is the substance 
and not the title of statutes that grant them effect, and § 230(c)(1) 
has no Good Samaritan requirement.267 
b. The Definitional Approach and the Intent of § 230 
If a court claims that the only reason for enacting § 230 was to 
counteract the troubling Stratton decision, it can support only a 
definitional approach.268 Stratton was outrageous because it 
punished a website for attempting to screen offensive content, 
when the website would have faced no liability if it had simply 
allowed offensive content to be posted freely.269 If § 230 was 
meant only to prevent a similar injustice from occurring again, 
then only § 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity is needed. If 
that is the case, § 230(c)(1) should be read as definitional. 
However, this argument also fails because the assertion that § 230 
was meant exclusively to prevent a Stratton situation is not 
necessarily true. The House Conference Committee’s report 
recognizes that it is only “[o]ne of the specific purposes” of § 230 
to overrule Stratton and similar decisions.270 Further, the CDA’s 
congressional debate recognized the impossible burden that 
websites face if they can be held liable for third-party content, even 
if they do not make attempts to screen offensive content.271 The 
congressional concern about this burden suggests that a narrow 
definitional reading of § 230 was not its intent. 
                                                                                                             
 
Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). If this 
does not make sense to the reader, it is not supposed to. Herein lies much of the 
confusion caused by the comingling of competing § 230 interpretations. 
 266. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256 
(2004) (“The caption of a statute, this Court has cautioned, ‘cannot undo or limit 
that which the [statute’s] text makes plain.’”) (citing Trainmen v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947)). 
 267. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). 
 268. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.12 (stating that “it seems to be 
the principal or perhaps the only purpose” of § 230 to overrule Stratton). 
 269. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 270. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added) 
(“One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. 
Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and 
users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have 
restricted access to objectionable material.”). 
 271. See 141 CONG. REC. 22,046 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Goodlatte). 




Finally, perhaps the most convincing argument for a definitional 
approach, and one that has stumped the Ninth Circuit,272 is the 
reward of Zeran–publisher immunity to websites that do nothing to 
screen content when § 230 was enacted specifically to motivate 
websites to take action. However, Congress also did not want 
websites to face the burden of liability for third-party content.273 
Protection for websites that do nothing is the price the Zeran–
publisher approach accepts in order to guarantee that websites are 
never punished for third-party content. As discussed earlier, only by 
providing immunity to all websites––even those with knowledge 
and even those who do nothing––can websites be fully encouraged 
to participate in the content-screening process. 
For all its logical and structural validity, the definitional 
approach remains inferior to the Zeran–publisher approach. 
Section 230 was meant to provide substantial protection to 
websites that permit third parties to contribute content. The limited 
immunity of a definitional approach plainly falls short of this. 
Although the definitional approach is supported by certain canons 
of statutory interpretation, nothing can change the plain wording of 
§ 230(c)(1): “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”274  
2. An Imminent Conflict: The Viability of the Barnes Reverse 
Definitional Approach 
In Barnes, the Ninth Circuit provided the first and only version 
of a reverse definitional approach.275 The court explained that its 
approach was derived from a recognition of the congressional intent 
to reward only those websites which take affirmative actions—now, 
providers of content who are ineligible for immunity under § 
230(c)(1) can obtain immunity under § 230(c)(2) if they restrict 
access to that content.276 This interpretation of § 230(c)(2) does not 
change the actual “apparent contradiction” the court was claiming to 
address: the sweeping immunity that § 230(c)(1) gives to those 
websites that do nothing to control content.277  
The reverse definitional approach also runs contrary to any 
supportable reasoning because it conflicts with the words, history, 
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 274. 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 275. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.  
 276. See id. 
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and intent of the CDA. According to Barnes, websites can create 
offensive content and then obtain immunity by acting “to restrict 
access to the content because they consider it obscene.”278 This may 
not run into the problem of rewarding immunity for doing nothing, 
but it does something even more unacceptable: it rewards immunity 
to a website that actively creates the content.279 Surely, if it makes 
no sense to reward passivity, as the Ninth Circuit claims, then it is 
absurd to reward obscene activity.280 
Additionally, the very wording of the statute forbids this result. 
Section 230(c)(2)(A) immunizes only actions “taken in good 
faith,” an unlikely description for the actions of someone who has 
already been determined to be the creator of obscene, defamatory, 
or illegal content.281 It is equally unlikely that Congress would ever 
create a legal immunity for obscenity-providers that have a change 
of heart. The Communications Decency Act was meant to foster 
Internet growth and prevent the unregulated proliferation of 
obscenity online.282 If it stretches the CDA’s purpose to immunize 
websites that make no effort to filter third-party obscenity, then it 
mocks the CDA’s purpose to immunize a creator of obscenity for 
not successfully blocking its own content. If the reverse 
definitional approach of Barnes is ever questioned, the Ninth 
Circuit most certainly faces a confusing and losing battle. 
Conversely, by returning to the unified Zeran–publisher approach, 
the Ninth Circuit can at once embrace the most viable approach 
and rejoin the judicial consensus. 
3. Stubborn Survivor: The Strict Publisher Interpretation  
The “strict publisher” interpretation of § 230(c) is similar to the 
Zeran–publisher approach, but it leaves room for interactive 
service providers to face liability for content of which they are 
aware. The strict publisher interpretation remains a minority view, 
but its popularity among scholars283 and plaintiffs284 continues to 
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 281. See id. 
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make it relevant. Whether Congress intended a broad protection for 
those websites that knowingly permit the posting of defamatory or 
illegal content is still the subject of controversy.285 The strict 
publisher approach is arguably a fairer balance of the competing 
congressional goals of Internet growth and obscenity control.286 
Under this approach, websites, as distributors, would still not face 
liability for third-party content. However, if websites are notified 
of illegal or obscene content, they would be forced to remove it––
something websites should do. 
The fairness of this approach is attractive, but it too must yield 
to the Zeran–publisher approach. As discussed earlier, liability 
upon notice presents the triple threat of (1) encouraging websites to 
remove any complaint system whereby they might have knowledge 
imputed to them, (2) the unbearable burden of considering every 
complaint received, and (3) the risk that websites will just remove 
all controversial content, thus chilling speech.287 A website that 
refuses to remove horribly defamatory or obscene content is more 
of a danger in theory than in practice. The Zeran–publisher 
approach recognizes this risk, too, but has made the determination 
that punishing innocent conduits of information is the greater and 
far more likely injustice. 
C. Tending to the Wounded: Refining a Chaotic Jurisprudence 
A few courts have already helped to create harmony by 
acknowledging the nearly-uniform jurisprudence that has spread 
with the Zeran–publisher immunity interpretation of § 230.288 
However, the process is not nearly complete. When the Seventh 
Circuit refused to identify its publisher protection as an immunity, 
it injected substantial confusion into the analysis. The result is an 
illusion of disagreement.289 Both of the widely-adopted 
approaches––the Zeran third-party approach and the publisher 
approach––are carefully applied in the same way to extend 
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immunity only when the defendant is acting in its publisher 
capacity.290 The Seventh Circuit must reconcile its own publisher 
approach with the Zeran publisher approach and recognize that 
they are indeed the same—a unified Zeran–publisher immunity. 
Courts must also be mindful of the impure applications of this 
unified Zeran–publisher approach. Specifically, this Comment 
cautions against the continued misapplication of definitional 
reasoning by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. These particularly 
influential courts must use their roles to clarify the state of the law. 
Both circuits must abandon the reasoning of the definitional 
approach that has infiltrated their respective opinions.291 If their 
respective courts are going to recognize any form of protection 
derived from § 230(c)(1), they must recognize that it functions as 
more than a definition.292 If they are going to protect websites that 
do not take steps to screen content and become Good Samaritan 
screeners, then they must stop demanding that the entire text of the 
statute relate only to its title,293 and they must stop claiming that 
the CDA should be limited to overruling Stratton.294  
Finally, if the Ninth Circuit recognizes that it has mistakenly 
signaled approval of a definitional reading of § 230, it must 
acknowledge that the jurisprudential inbreeding is the only thing 
responsible for its makeshift § 230 interpretation in Barnes.295 It has 
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effectively created a broad new approach that potentially immunizes 
the creation of defamatory and other illegal content.296 By 
renouncing the definitional reasoning dicta utilized by 
Roommates.com and Barnes, the court will not be forced into the 
same corner again.  
V. CONCLUSION 
No approach to the CDA can offer both a broad immunity to 
websites and a broad protection to potential victims of defamation, 
discrimination, or any other illegal content. Every interpretation of 
the CDA suffers from some form of conflicting reasoning, ignored 
legislative intent, or unfavorable result. These considerations are 
indeed competing, and the inherent result is compromise. A unified 
Zeran–publisher approach is the only interpretation of § 230 that 
protects the interests of both prudence and justice. Allowing 
SOF.com to gain immunity after Mr. Savage posts his ad on the 
website is the only way to encourage the website to screen content 
fearlessly and fairly. Both Congress297 and the courts298 wisely 
prefer this result to its converse—a website that faces liability for 
the content of millions of posts it cannot read, and instead prefers 
not to let third parties communicate any ideas on its forum. 
Courts face a tough challenge if they hope to refine the CDA’s 
jurisprudence. They must become keenly aware of the varying 
interpretations of § 230. The differing interpretive approaches have 
collided dramatically in a cloud of conflict, feigned agreement, and 
illusions of disagreement. It is time to pick up the pieces of the 
CDA’s jurisprudence, sweep away the debris, and recognize the 
legacy of the Zeran–publisher approach.  
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